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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kent Torrey Ostler appeals from the judgment entered upon the district
court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In September 2012, Ostler pled guilty to lewd conduct with a child under
the age of 16 years. (R., pp.31-32, 47-50, 66.) In exchange for Ostler’s plea, the
state dismissed a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.32, 47, 50.) There
was “no agreement as to the sentence”; instead, “[b]oth parties were free to
argue the appropriate sentence after the [presentence and psychosexual]
evaluations.”

(R., p.47; see also p.32.)

“Prior to the completion of Ostler’s

presentence report and his psychosexual evaluation, Ostler filed a pro se motion
to withdraw his guilty plea,” which the district court denied. (R., p.67; see also
pp.33-45.) The court thereafter imposed a unified sentence of 30 years, with 10
years fixed.

(R., p.67.)

Ostler’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on

appeal and the Remittitur was filed on March 14, 2014. (Id.)
On January 30, 2015, Ostler filed a verified petition and affidavit for postconviction relief. (R., pp.4-11.) Relevant to this appeal, the petition alleged trial
counsel was ineffective for “manipulat[ing] Petitioner into pleading guilty by telling
Petitioner he had to plead guilty in order to do the evaluation.”

(R., p.6

(capitalization altered); see also p.7 (“The prosecutor along with counsel, told
Petitioner that in order to do the evaluation he had to plead guilty[.]”
(capitalization altered)), p.10 (“Petitioner was told that in order to get the
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evaluation that Petitioner had to enter a plea of guilty,” and “Petitioner would
have not entered a plea of guilty had it not been manipulated[.]” (capitalization
altered)), p.11 (“Petitioner was manipulated into pleading guilty by his attorney
and the prosecutor[.]” (capitalization altered).) After post-conviction counsel was
appointed (R., p.24), the state answered the petition and moved to summarily
dismiss it (R., pp.26-52, 59-60). Following a hearing, the district court entered a
written order granting the state’s motion and dismissing Ostler’s petition in its
entirety. (R., pp.65-78.) Ostler filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment.
(R., pp.79-84.)
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ISSUE
Ostler states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court err in granting the State’s motion for
summary dismissal of Mr. Ostler’s claim that his guilty plea was not
voluntary, because there exists a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether his guilty plea was a product of his counsel’s
manipulation?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Ostler failed to carry his appellate burden of showing the district court
erred in summarily dismissing his claim that trial counsel manipulated him into
pleading guilty because Ostler has failed to challenge two of the three bases on
which the district court actually dismissed that claim?
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ARGUMENT
Ostler Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His
Claim That Trial Counsel Manipulated Him Into Pleading Guilty
A.

Introduction
Ostler challenges the summary dismissal of his claim that trial counsel

manipulated him into pleading guilty, arguing the district court erred in failing to
recognize Ostler’s sworn allegations that trial counsel told him he could not
obtain an evaluation unless he pled guilty were themselves admissible evidence
that, if true, “could” entitle him to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.8-9.) The state acknowledges Ostler’s sworn allegations of fact constituted
admissible evidence and, as such, the district court’s ruling that Ostler was
required to present a sworn statement or testimony from trial counsel attesting to
the truth of Ostler’s allegations in order to overcome summary dismissal (see R.,
p.73) was incorrect.

Ostler has failed to show any basis for reversal of the

district court’s summary dismissal order, however, because the district court
summarily dismissed Ostler’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on two
additional bases – that Ostler’s allegations were disproved by the record and that
Ostler’s claim of prejudice was conclusory and failed to present an issue of
material fact (R., pp.73-74) – neither of which Ostler challenges on appeal.
Because Ostler has not even asserted, much less demonstrated, error in relation
to the court’s alternative rulings, the court’s order summarily dismissing Ostler’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be affirmed on these unchallenged
bases.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).
C.

The District Court’s Order Summarily Dismissing Ostler’s Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel Claim Must Be Affirmed On The Unchallenged
Bases That The Claim Was Disproved By The Record And That Ostler
Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact With Respect To The
Prejudice Prong Of His Claim
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative. “To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
to summary dismissal “if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of
material fact” as to each element of the petitioner’s claims. Workman, 144 Idaho
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72,
90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations
as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions
of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State,
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135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged
facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief. Id. (citing Stuart v.
State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). “Allegations contained
in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are
clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify
relief as a matter of law.” Id.
To overcome summary dismissal of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that “(1) a material issue of fact exists as to
whether counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of fact
exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced [the petitioner’s] case.” Baldwin v.
State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations
omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice).

In the general context of ineffective

assistance of counsel affecting the plea, the petitioner “must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58
(1985) (footnote and citations omitted). “Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of
claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
Applying the foregoing legal principles, the district court articulated three
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separate bases why Ostler failed to show entitlement to an evidentiary hearing
on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. First, the court held that Ostler’s
verified statements that counsel told him he had to enter a plea of guilty in order
to get an “evaluation” were conclusory and not sufficient, by themselves, to
create an issue of fact that, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to withdraw
his plea. (R., p.73; see also p.74 (Ostler’s statement he was manipulated into
pleading guilty “does not offer any evidence to support it.”).) Second, the court
held that Ostler’s claim that trial counsel manipulated him into pleading guilty (by
telling him he could not get an “evaluation” unless he did so) was “disproved by
the transcript from the change-of-plea hearing.” (R., p.74 (footnote omitted).)
Finally, the court held that Ostler’s assertion that he would not have entered the
guilty plea “had it not been manipulated” was conclusory and did not present an
issue of material fact as to the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. (R., p.74.)
On appeal, Ostler challenges only one of the three bases on which the
trial court summarily dismissed his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Specifically, he argues the court erred in failing to recognize his sworn
allegations of fact were themselves admissible evidence that, if true, “could”
have entitled him to withdrawal of his plea. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.) The state
readily concedes that, had the district court’s decision to dismiss Ostler’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim rested entirely on the court’s erroneous
belief that Ostler was required to present a sworn statement or testimony from
trial counsel attesting to the truth of Ostler’s verified allegations, Ostler would be
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entitled to relief from the court’s order. See, e.g., Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696,
704, 367 P.3d 1050, 1058 (Ct. App. 2015) (“A petitioner’s factual allegations that
are based upon personal knowledge are admissible when presented through a
verified petition or a notarized affidavit.”); Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d
at 802 (court must accept petitioner’s unrebutted factual allegations as true). A
review of the record clearly shows, however, that the court dismissed Ostler’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on two additional bases – i.e., that the
claim was disproved by the underlying criminal record and that Ostler’s allegation
of prejudice (i.e., that he would not have entered a guilty plea “had it not been
manipulated”) was merely conclusory. (R., pp.73-74.) Because Ostler has not
even asserted, much less demonstrated, that the district court erred in its
alternative rulings, the court’s order summarily dismissing Ostler’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim must be affirmed on these unchallenged bases.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
order summarily dismissing Ostler’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 21st day of September, 2016.
_/s/ Lori A. Fleming______
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of September, 2016, served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing
an electronic copy to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

LAF/dd

_/s/ Lori A. Fleming_______
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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